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Wesley Clair Mitchell published his first major work on business
cycles in 1913 and he founded the National Bureau of Economic
Research in 1920. For more than fifty years the bureau was the
focus of research in the Mitchellian tradition, beginning with the pub-
lication of Willard Thorp's Annals in 1926 and continuing through a
long list of major contributions to the measurement and analysis of
economic instability. A significant step toward wide public use of
these results was taken in 1961 when the Department of Commerce
began publishing monthly a collection of the leading, coincident and
lagging indicators selected by the National Bureau. The initiation of
Business Conditions Digest (called Business Cycle Developments for
the first seven years of its life) represented official recognition that
whatever other techniques may be used in analyzing instability, the
notion of reliable leading, coincident, and lagging indicators had been
widely accepted as a diagnostic tool.
The initiation of the International Economic Indicators (lET) proj-
ect at the National Bureau in 1973 by Moore and Klein was in one
sense an explicit extension of the Mitchellian indicator approach to
the international economic scene and in another sense a return to
the international perspective with which Mitchell began. The TEl
project rested on two basic questions:
1.Is the notion of a growth cycle a useful approach to the study of
cyclical instability in a number of market-oriented economies?
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H That is, can growth cycle chronologies be established for them in
a comparable manner?
2.Can rough equivalents for the U.S. leading and lagging indicators
of classical cycles be found for other countries, and, if so, do
they exhibit comparable tendencies to lead or lag at growth cycle
turning points in those countries?
The overriding conclusion of the present study is that both of
these questions can be answered in the affirmative. We began by
adapting the National Bureau's computer program, which had been
designed to date classical cycle turning points, to date the growth
cycle turning points. Briefly, this adaptation involved taking devia-
tions from a flexible (yet smooth) long-term trend in order to isolate
short-run movements in the data. A list of computer-selected cyclical
turning points in the principal measures of aggregate economic activ-
ity was then derived for each of the countries under study. After
reviewing and occasionally modifying the results, we devised a growth
cycle chronology for each country based on the consensus among
these turning points. Just as the selection of business cycle reference
dates has always been a crucial analytical step in the work on classi-
cal cycles, so, too, is the selection of appropriate growth cycle chro-
nologies in growth cycle analysis.
One major decision we made in our work with indicators was to
recognize explicitly the impact of generally higher inflation rates.
Accordingly, all indicators that are measured in terms of value are
deflated by a price index. This was not a common practice among
business cycle analysts prior to the 1970s. Today we know of no
growth cycle studies that do not work with series expressed in con-
stant prices or in physical units so as to separate real from price
phenomena.
We have thus far produced growth cycle chronologies for more
than a dozen countries in the research program that is now con-
ducted at the Center for International Business Cycle Research at
Columbia University. In this book we have concentrated attention on
the ten major industrialized market-oriented economies.' Some of
the more interesting implications should now be summarized. In the
United States, from 1948 to 1980, there have been ten growth cycles.
Seven of them correspond to the seven classical cycles dated by the
NBER (although the precise dates of peaks and troughs differ, as
would be expected in series in which turning points are selected from
trend-adjusted data). One of the additional three growth cycle epi-
sodes occurs at the time of the Korean War, and two in the 1960s.
While the data are not adequate for a comparable period in all the
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continuedto manifest a greater number of cyclical episodes (with
correspondingly shorter duration) than most other countries.
Ten Canadian growth cycles can also be discerned in the period
1949 -80; six U.K. growth cycles, 1950 -75; six West German growth
cycles, 1950 -75; six Japanese growth cycles, 1953—80; four Belgian
growth cycles, 1955-80; five French growth cycles, 1955—80; and
five Italian growth cycles, 1955-81. The appearance of a classical
cycle in all seven of these countries in 1973—75 and again in 1980 -82
argues strongly for the continued monitoring of both classical and
growth cycles despite the greater complexity that such a course will
initially engender in research activities. Clearly, constructing growth
cycle chronologies for countries other than the United States by
adapting the Mitchell technique to growth cycle research can be
regarded as eminently feasible.
An independent check on the usefulness of the growth cycle turn-
ing points can be performed by associating them with the leading and
lagging indicators classified by their typical behavior at classical turn-
ing points in the United States. Admittedly, utilizing the short list of
classical cycle indicators established for the U.S. in 1966 was an
expedient, but it has proved to be an efficient way to test the feasi-
bility of developing leading and lagging indicators of growth cycle
turning points, in the United States as well as elsewhere.
Our findings with respect to these indicators may be summarized
very simply. When the twenty-four U.S. indicators were recast in
growth cycle terms they all retained their original timing classifica-
tion. The leading indicators were as successful in anticipating growth
cycles (including the three growth cycles that had no classical cycle
counterpart) as they had been in anticipating classical cycles. There
were occasional instances of both skipped and extra cycles, but cer-
tainly no more than has been the case in using these series as indi-
cators of classical cycles.
With few exceptions the classification of indicators taken over
from U.S. classical cycles is as valid for foreign growth cycles as it
is for U.S. growth cycles. While some individual indicators are map-
propriately related to individual growth turns (as has always been the
case at classical cycle turns in the United States as well), in general,
the exceptions are only slightly more frequent at foreign growth
turns than they are at U.S. growth turns, and both are acceptably
consistent with the U.S. classical cycle record. It is fair to add, how-
ever, that instances when the indicator system fails to produce the
expected temporal pattern are more numerous for the smaller foreign
countries included in the study (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Sweden). Whether this suggests that the indicator system is basically350 Applying the Indicator System
lessappropriate for smaller economies, or for economies more depen-
dent on foreign trade, is difficult to say. Certainly, much remains to
be done to improve the reliability of the indicator systems in all
countries. While the overall performance rate of the indicator system
in foreign economies is remarkably high, the areas where indicators
have not performed well constitute a major item for future research.
In addition, the lack of comparable data for particular indicators is
especially pronounced as soon as one moves beyond the five or six
largest and most industrialized economies. By demonstrating that
indicator systems are useful diagnostic additions to other techniques
of forecasting and cyclical analysis, we hope to spur the improve-
ment and availability of data in all economies where business cycles
continue to manifest themselves.
One searches with scant success for evidence that particular indi-
cators are consistently less reliable in one country than another. The
exceptions to expected patterns appear to be distributed more or less
randomly among indicators and across countries. The major excep-
tions among the leading indicators are as follows. In Italy, the typical
timing for the average workweek is a lag. Building permits lag in West
Germany and do not match growth cycles in Sweden. In the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands industrial materials prices lag, and in
Sweden the change in consumer credit lags. Among the roughly coin-
cident indicators, the poorest performer is retail sales, which leads by
more than three months in Japan, Italy, and Belgium, but lags by
more than three months in West Germany and Sweden. Employment
exhibits a clear-cut tendency to lag in France and to a lesser extent
in Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In sum, the behavior of
the six roughly coincident indicators is strongly supportive overall of
their U.S. classification. Among the lagging indicators, business loans
exhibit a median lead in West Germany, while short-term interest
rates show a short lead in the Netherlands.
This completes the list of indicators diverging from the expected
pattern. The average timing for each indicator, for all countries taken
together, shows the expected median timing, except in the case of
employment, which shows a two-month lag. In no case is the number
of countries in which an indicator fails to produce the expected aver-
age timing greater than three. Six of the twelve leaders, four of six
roughly coincident indicators, and three of the six laggers show no
countries diverging from the timing classification of these indicators
at U.S. classical cycles.
In short, one can locate examples of anomalous behavior, but such
behavior is no more prevalent among foreign countries than it has
typically been in the United States at classical cycle turns. Moreover,Toward an Improved International System of Business Cycle Indicators 351
theseanomalies in indicator behavior appear to be randomly scat-
tered. It is, of course, important to continue monitoring the record
of growth cycle indicators both here and abroad, as indeed we have
done for many years with indicators of classical turning points in the
United States. We fully anticipate that the lists of indicators will be
revised from time to time and that there will continue to be addi-
tions to and deletions from the list of "most reliable indicators." But
there is no reason now to suppose that the basic classification of indi-
cators is any less permanent or more ephemeral for foreign countries.
In the United States structural changes and data improvements have
accounted for substitutions in the list of indicators of classical turns
far more often than changes in classification (which have, in fact,
been extremely rare historically). Moreover, a major question that
will need to be resolved in the future concerns the conflict between
the virtues of maintaining a common list for all countries and the
usefulness of obtaining the most sensitive and reliable list for fore-
casting in each country.
One of the more encouraging signs for the future analysis of inter-
national economic indicators has been the general acceptance among
OECD countries of the feasibility of developing growth-cycle chro-
nologies and indicator systems. The OECD has agreed to measure
growth cycles in terms of "output—broadly defined" and to con-
struct corresponding lists of indicators classified by timing. This ef-
fort has resulted in a good many national chronologies covering the
postwar years. Indeed, the Secretariat has even attempted chronolo-
gies for those few OECD countries that have not produced a chro-
nology of their own, with the result that—as we have already noted—
growth cycle chronologies have proliferated in recent years.
The indicator system that we have developed is based primarily on
"quantitative indicators." While "qualitative indicators" based on
opinion surveys are not unknown in the United States, reliance has
never been placed heavily on them because of the wealth of quanti-
tative statistics. Nevertheless, qualitative measures often have con-
siderable utility because of the greater promptness with which they
become available and the greater smoothness survey net balances
often exhibit in comparison to the equivalent quantitative series. One
of our concerns in this book has centered on the usefulness of these
qualitative indicators in cyclical analysis. We find that when the sur-
vey net balances are appropriately treated, the actual lead at turns is
not as long, in many cases, as is the case with the comparable quanti-
tative series. Augmenting the forecasting potential of quantitative
indicators is not the only—or perhaps even the primary—function of
qualitative indicators. In many situations one is interested in entre-I
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preneurialattitudes in and of themselves. This is surely a major pur-
pose behind the harmonized surveys carried out by the European
Economic Commission. We have concluded that while qualitative
indicators can sometimes provide valuable evidence with which to
diagnose cyclical developments, their advantages lie primarily in
terms of the up-to-date information they contain.
In addition to constructing growth cycle chronologies and indi-
cator systems, we have considered several possible extensions, and
new applications of these indicators, for example, in the develop-
ment of the concept of a world cycle. We found that from a compos-
ite index of all the roughly coincident indicators for all the countries
under review we could identify a chronology of peaks and troughs
that represented generally consilient cycles in all the countries. We
also found that a composite of the leading indicators for all countries
anticipated the turns in this world growth cycle chronology. Further-
more, the data suggest that no country can be termed a consistent
initiator of world upswings or downswings.
If it is difficult to conclude that the sequence of cyclical changes
runs invariably from any one or two countries to the other countries,
it is still pertinent to inquire whether overall changes in international
economic instability can be forecast by individual countries so as to
predict changes in their imports or exports. We have tested this
notion and conclude that cyclically sensitive trade flows can be fore-
cast with the help of leading indicators. One test was based on U.S.
trade with six other countries. We showed that exports are condi-
tioned primarily by the stage of the growth cycle in the importing
country or countries, with the result that any exporting nation can
forecast its exports to any other country or group of countries for
which a leading index is available.
We considered the implications of this finding not only for U.S.
exports but for imports as well. And we examined the possibilities
of forecasting total manufacturing exports by the United States to
the other countries and summarized the results for a number of indi-
vidual commodities as well. Because the countries we examined corn-
prised nearly half of total U.S. export demand, the results were
moderately encouraging regarding the use of leading indexes to fore-
cast total U.S. exports.
We then reversed the process and found that British exports of
manufactured goods, as well as those of West Germany, Japan, and
all the less-developed countries could be reasonably well forecast
with changes in the leading index for the six major countries, which
together absorb a large percentage of the world's imports. Increased
availability of leading indexes for other countries will likely yield
j_.. I. .r
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significantdividends in the form of greater accuracy in forecasting
trade flows. The method can be adapted to take account of changes
in exchange rates and to forecast changes in trade balances.
Finally, we explored very briefly the possibilities of forecasting
changes in inflation rates by means of leading indicators. This exer-
cise provided a cogent example of the critical relationships among
business cycle theory, measurement, and analysis. Because inflation
has become a problem endemic to many market-oriented economies,
it was necessary for us to deflate price-denominated indicators so as
to separate real from inflation rate fluctuations. But it is nevertheless
true that both kinds of fluctuations emerge from the interaction of
supply and demand pressures. It is the sequential logic of these inter-
relationships that forms the rationale for the leading, roughly coin-
cident, and lagging indicators.
This is not to argue in support of the proposition that inflation is a
real rather than a monetary phenomenon—it is perhaps more accu-
rate to say that real and monetary phenomena are themselves inter-
related and the behavior of the indicators is related to both, even if
the effects are best viewed separately. Our examination of the behav-
ior of industrial materials prices (an early indicator of changing infla-
tion rates) and consumer prices (used to measure inflation rates)
within the growth cycle chronologies suggested that the view taken
here of the relationship between inflation and growth cycle indica-
tors is both reliable and useful. As such, it suggests yet another area
in which cycle indicators could contribute to forecasting efforts.
MEASUREMENTAND THEORY:
r THEAPPROPRIATE MIX
Somereaders may feel that the evidence we have presented is so con-
s vincing, or so close to what they expected, that our findings almost
) speakfor themselves. Nevertheless, to us it has seemed necessary to
present all the initial evidence for each of the countries considered.
This approach, analyzing each series and each turning point for which
evidence can be found, has been the traditional approach taken by
Mitchell and his followers.
Other readers may feel that our detailed display of evidence signi-
fies nothing, because it is not placed explicitly in the context of a
complete theory or model of the business cycle with all of the inter-
t national implications spelled out. Without such a theory, some may
claim, we do not really know how the system works, how parts fit
the whole, or how confident one can be that these relations will per-
ti sist. This debate was discussed in considerable detail in Chapter 1.354 Applying the Indicator System
Clearly,there is merit in developing a detailed explanatory system.
We take the view, however, that useful results can be achieved with-
out it—useful in the sense that partial results are understandable or
explainable and capable of being tested against future data or data
for other economies. Moreover, such partial results may have other
advantages. They can be reached more quickly and hence provide
useful information at an earlier date, and they can be comprehended
more readily by a larger group of potential users. The leading mdi-
cators we now possess, for example, are easier to understand than
some other current approaches to forecasting. The idea that new
orders for goods contain useful information about future sales, out-
put, employment, and income is not difficult to comprehend, and
not difficult to observe in the data.2 Consequently, this idea was
being used by forecasters for many years before it was incorporated
into econometric models. In fact, the development and improvement
of new-orders data was one of the recommendations in Burns and
Mitchell's original study of
Although we have not organized our work on indicators around
the concept of a large-scale international economic model, this does
not that partial theories or explanations have not played an
important role. Without them one would have little or no confidence
that past relationships would persist or be applicable elsewhere. Par-
tial theories have always been a part of Mitchellian business cycle
research. For every indicator we have had a hypothesis (or several
hypotheses) explaining its behavior. Many reports outlining and test-
ing these hypotheses have been published over the years. Moreover,
the tests have frequently been replicated using new data. The succes-
sive studies of indicators (Mitchell and Burns in 1938, Moore in 1950
and 1960, Moore and Shiskin in 1967, and Zarnowitz and Boschan in
1975) are such a series of replications. Stanback's work on inven-
tories (1962) replicated that of Abramovitz (1950); Kessel's (1965)
and Cagan's (1966) work on interest rates replicated that of Macaulay
(1938); Klein's work on consumer credit (1971) replicated that of
Haberler (1942); and Hultgren's work on costs and profits (1965)
replicated that of Mitchell Of course, each author added
some new hypothesis or revised or expanded an old one, and all had
more data against which to test their hypotheses.
CLASSICALCYCLES AND GROWTH CYCLES
Ifthe publication of Business Conditions Digest can be viewed as the
official demise of the debate over the appropriateness and usefulness
• .---••1
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ofthe NBER technique in studying classical business cycles, it was
ironically followed by another debate—premature, as it turned out—
concerning the possible obsolescence of the classical business cycle.
Some have argued, of course, that growth cycles merely represent a
newer form of the classical cycles measured for the United States,
Britain, France, and Germany. It is worth remembering, though, how
rapidly one's perspective can change, and how dangerous it is to
allow a fundamental perspective to be altered by short-lived events.
In the 1960s and early '70s, prior to the severe recession of 197 3—75,
there was not only little real concern about business cycles in foreign
countries (let alone the possibility of world cycles), but not much
concern with cycles in the United States either. One of those who
was concerned was use Mintz, who saw the potential value of a
new attempt to measure growth cycles,5 and she reported her work
on this very topic at the Fiftieth Anniversary colloquium held at
the National Bureau in 1970. In this connection Paul Samuelson
commented:
Now that the National Bureau is fifty years old, it has worked itself out of
s one of its first jobs,namelythe business cycle. I don't know when the
American Cancer Society was founded, but by similar reasoning fifty years
after that date some optimist could hope to cross cancer off his list. The
Bureau was thus in danger of becoming just a museum of fossils; but
e nobody likes to work himself out of a job, so you naturally redefined the
field to study. I predicted some time ago that this would happen, and Use
Mintz. .. hasconfirmed my prediction.6
No doubt Samuelson would agree that this view, expressed in
1970, was premature, and that the appearance four years later and
o againeight years after that of relatively severe, classical recessions
might justify continued attention to business cycle research. Today
the preoccupation of the National Bureau of Economic Research
with both classical cycle and the growth cycle analysis is continued
at the Center for International Business Cycle Research at Columbia
University.
Erik Lundberg has written:
d History never repeats itself in exactly the same way. There are such impor-
tant differences between the catastrophic United States depression of
1929-33 and the mild recessions of 1926-27 and 1960-61 that from
some points of view they can well be classified in different categories. But
if we assume there is empirical evidence to make it sensible to talk about
the United States experience with cyclical instability over the period
1919-64 as a tolerably homogeneous set of phenomena, what about, for
instance, British, Dutch, or Swedish economic developments during the356 Applying the Indicator System
sameperiod? Or similar experiences in Japan, Australia, or South Ameri-
can countries? Do we have empirical evidence permitting us to classify the
instability experiences of these countries in the same category?7
Consideration of the issues raised in this passage by Lundberg is radi-
cally different if approached from the context of our work on growth
cycle measurement. To begin with, the important differences in vari-
ous U.S. cycles referred to earlier are now seen as related cyclical
episodes even though of varying severity. The reliability of tradi-
tional indicators in relation to growth cycles suggests that all cycles,
whether classical or growth, have much in common. Cycles may then
be viewed as occupying a continuum from most to least severe, and
that as classical cycles become less pronounced it becomes increas-
ingly necessary to measure them as growth cycles. Their common-
ality is certainly underscored by the consistency with which indica-
tors of one type of cycle can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of
the other.
Concerning the question of whether the "tolerably homogeneous
set of phenomena" of U.S. economic experience is or is not the same
as that found in foreign countries, we can clearly advance an answer
if we utilize the evidence developed in the preceding chapters. The
fact that the same methodology can be adapted with considerable
success to dating growth cycles in foreign countries and that rough
equivalents of U.S. classical cycle indicators bear reasonably con-
sistent temporal relationships to growth cycle turning points both in
the United States and in each of the other countries thus far tested
is just the sort of evidence that Lundberg called for. Indirectly, too,
an answer is suggested by the fact that the methodology is being used
by international organizations such as the OECD and EEC as well as
by statistical agencies, central banks, and research institutes in dif-
ferent countries on every continent.
Far from becoming fossils, therefore, cycles are simply being
viewed as phenomena sufficiently alike to justify isolation for pur-
poses of analysis, but subject nonetheless to an endless series of
changes and variations as they appear sequentially through the eco-
nomic history of eachof the economies in which they appear. More-
over, the term "fossil" connotes antiquated persons or things. If
antiquated means dead as well as old then it cannot possibly apply to
the growth cycle manifestation of the historic instability of market-
oriented economies. Cycles are old, but unhappily even classical
cycles are far from dead.Toward an Improved International System of Business Cycle Indicators 357
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
Webelieve the work reported in this volume can open many doors
for those who wish to gain an understanding of economic instability
and inflation in the modern world. The potential for further analysis
and ongoing research has been increased considerably by the intro-
duction of the growth cycle concept, by the development of a widely
applicable methodology for constructing growth cycle chronologies,
and by the identification of reasonably consistent leading and lagging
indicators of these growth cycle turning points in the major indus-
trialized economies dealt with in this book.
The computer programs developed originally at the National
Bureau and later revised at the Center for International Business
Cycle Research are available to all who request them. By exporting
the methodology we hope to facilitate both the research process and
its practical application throughout the industrialized world. Con-
tinued research is needed on such questions as how instability is
transmitted from one country to another, whether it can be said to
find its genesis more often in one country or countries than in others,
how and why countries find that their economic fortunes are tied
more surely or with greater impact to certain other countries, how
these matters affect trade, financial markets, and prices, and how
they are affected by economic policies.
A further possible extension of this work—only touched on in our
earlier discussion—is to apply the analysis to the exports of develop-
ing countries, insofar as their exports flow to the industrialized coun-
tries for which we have leading indicators. The countries we have
already covered import a substantial share of products from develop-
ing nations, and demand for such imports fluctuates with the rise and
fall of growth cycles. The leading indicators for the countries analy-
zed above, to say nothing of those we hope will ultimately be con-
structed, could be of considerable value to the developing nations in
f appraising their markets.
There is scarcely an organization engaged in economic research
today that is not deeply involved in studying the causes and conse-
quences of inflation. At the Columbia Center, for example, the appli-
cation of the leading indicator approach to forecasting inflation is
being actively extended and has already attracted wide interest. Since
there appears to be a clear sequence of changes involving the finan-
cia!, commodity, and labor markets that are ultimately reflected in
the rate of inflation in consumer prices, this sequence has enabled us
to construct a leading index of inflation for the United States and to
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exploreits capacity to forecast inflation.8 In addition, we have stud-
ied the possible extension of this method to other countries.9 We
believe that continued work on inflation indicators can, in short,
play a role in the worldwide effort to understand the inflation pro-
cess better and thus control it more effectively.
Another area at the frontier of indicator analysis concerns its ap-
plication to forecasting employment conditions. At the Columbia
Center a new U.S. index has been constructed based on those leading
indicators directly pertinent to employment or unemployment (the
average workweek in manufacturing, overtime hours in manufactur-
ing, initial claims for unemployment insurance, short-duration unem-
ployment, and a measure of changes in part-time employment due to
slack demand for employees). The index appears to yield useful fore-
casts of changes in unemployment and might well be developed for
other.countries.
The sequential relationships among groups of indicators is also
leading to the development of objective "signals" of forthcoming
changes, based upon the composite leading and coincident indexes.
These indexes each contain what is called a "target trend," which is
the long-run trend in the economy since 1948. The target trend
adjustment standardizes the trends so that both indexes have a trend
equal to the long-run rate for the economy. Differences among the
indexes observable at any particular time must be due to short-run
factors. When, therefore, the six-month smoothed rate of change in
any given index is less than the target trend rate, it is rising at a rate
below its long-run rate of growth, and presages a growth recession.
The signals that have been developed so far involve sequential changes
in both leading and coincident indexes and provide early warnings
and subsequent confirmation. These relationships obviously are de-
rived from typical behavior of the indexes during a number of pre-
vious recessions. Though originally devised to improve the efficacy
of countercycical public-works programs, the possibilities in this
approach are broad.'°
In the United States the effort to bring the experience of past
growth recessions and recoveries to bear in forecasting future devel-
opments has resulted in a periodic report of the Columbia Center
called "Recession-Recovery Watch." The publication tracks monthly
changes in the composite indexes, as well as in many individual indi-
cators, against their average behavior in previous business cycles over
comparable intervals after the last peak or trough. In this way cur-
rent developments can be assessed in the light of past experience.
While this approach appears promising in improving our ability to
monitor ongoing growth cycle developments, it has not yet been
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exploredto any great extent for other economies. The thrust of
much that has been reported in these pages suggests that this particu-
lar line of inquiry might be a promising path to pursue.
In determining whether and to what degree economic fluctuations
in industrial market-oriented countries may have widened in scope
and become more nearly synchronized,data on new orders for goods,
formation of business enterprises, contracts for industrial and com-
mercial construction, housing starts, inventory investment, price/cost
ratios, and other domestically sensitive measures of economic change
should be particularly instructive, in part because they have seldom,
if ever, been examined from this point of view. At the same time, it
would be essential to examine the more internationally sensitive mea-
sures, such as industrial materials prices, security prices, interest
rates, and foreign trade. Conceivably, the internationally sensitive
variables may have become less stable at the same time that the
domestically oriented variables have become more stable, as indeed
Mintz showed for U.S. exports.'1
Closely related to this type of analysis would be comparative inter-
national studies of particular economic processes such as inventory
accumulation; credit, the money supply, and interest rates; orders,
production, and investment; consumption and income; and so on.
The NBER has studied these processes and others for the United
States over many years, but only occasionally on an international
scale. With new data and new methods these studies could be ex-
tended to other countries. One example is provided by Desmond
O'Dea's analysis of the behavior of labor market indicators in post-
war Britain.'2 Our preliminary work has already suggested that cer-
tain economic variables, such as those pertaining to employment, or
the housing market, or to foreign trade, may not be related to one
another in precisely the same way in every country. For example, it
is evident that in many countries housing starts are highly sensitive to
cyclical fluctuations, and it is generally believed that monetary pol-
icy has a large impact upon this industry. But in Japan housing starts
are relatively stable, though still performing as a leading indicator.
What is the source of this immunity and what implications does it
have for economic policy? In Sweden we saw that the turns in hous-
ing starts could not even be related to the growth cycle chronology.
The explanation there lay in the highly regulated nature of the hous-
ing industry. Whatever the explanations for anomalous behavior may
be; the indicator data we have assembled, supplemented by related
data, ought to facilitate a number of comparative studies of this type.
P Oneof the products of the IEI project is a methodology for mea-
suring long-run trends. The method is flexible enough to reveal chang.
L .11
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inglong-term rates of growth quite promptly, yet is little affected by
the short-run cyclical movements that have been our primary con-
cern. Trend rates of growth are derived for every indicator, and can
be brought up to date every few years without extensive revision of
results for earlier years. A method of extrapolation to future years
has been built into the program, although we have not tested it
extensively. If business cycles—whether classical or growth cycles—
are part of a long-run process best regarded as growth at irregular
rates, it follows that the study of what determines underlying growth
rates ought to contribute to the understanding of economic instabil-
ity and vice versa. In this connection, therefore, the trend measures
that we derived as part of our study of growth cycles for every series
ought to open up a wealth of material that could be the focus in
studies of economic growth, of productivity and costs, of capital
investment, of market shares and competitiveness, and of inflation-
ary trends.
In order to make the indicator data promptly and widely available
on a current basis, in original as well as trend-adjusted form, together
with trend rates of growth, composite indexes, and other analytical
measures described and illustrated earlier, an international data bank
is essential. Major steps in this direction have already been taken. It is
technically feasible for such a data bank to be supplied daily with
new data from a network of computers in the countries producing
the data and at the same time to make the analytical products of the
data bank accessible through computer terminals to users of the data.
This is, in fact, the way in which several data banks operate, includ-
ing what was formerly the National Bureau's data bank of U.S. eco-
nomic time series. In this instance the indicators are updated each
day, and companies, universities, and government agencies obtain the
data either through a time-sharing system or by purchasing magnetic
tapes updated monthly.
We have earlier indicated that the computer programs developed in
the course of the work reported on in this book have been made
available to the OECD, the EEC, to a number of government agen-
cies, as well as to private research organizations. The Columbia Cen-
ter now issues a monthly report on the standing of the indicators in
major countries, and the Conference Board circulates a summary
report to its member companies. In this effort we have had the co-
operation of the OECD, as well as several government agencies both
in the U.S. and in other countries. But much needs to be done to
improve the timeliness and accuracy of the data transmitted, as well
as to expand its coverage internationally. As a reporting system of
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thiskind develops, not only will the countries involved be encour-
aged to improve the quality, comparability, and timeliness of their
statistics, but the resulting international exchange of data and re-
search findings will greatly enhance our understanding of the causes
and consequences of international economic fluctuations.
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